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The Emergence of Intersectional Disadvantage
Cailin O’Connor, Liam K. Bright, Justin P. Bruner
Intersectionality theory explores the peculiar disadvantages that arise as the
result of occupying multiple disadvantaged demographic categories. Address-
ing intersectionality theory through quantitative methods has proven diffi-
cult. Concerns have been raised about the sample size one would need in
order to responsibly tease out evidence for the claims of intersectionality the-
orists. What is more, theorists have expressed concern about our ability to
formulate novel intersectional hypotheses in a non-ad-hoc manner. We argue
that simulation methods can help address these, and other, methodological
problems, because they can generate novel hypotheses about causal depen-
dencies in a relatively cheap way, and can thus guide future empirical work.
We illustrate this point using models which show that intersectional oppres-
sion can arise under conditions where social groups are disadvantaged in the
emergence of bargaining norms. As we show, intersectional disadvantage can
arise even when actors from all social categories are completely identical in
terms of preferences and abilities. And when actors behave in ways that
reflect stronger intersectional identities, the potential for disadvantage in-
creases. As we note, this exploration illustrates the usefulness of idealized
models to real world inquiry.
1 Introduction
Intersectionality theory is a branch of social theorizing focused on the effects of occupying
multiple demographic categories.1 It arose from the work of black feminists who highlight
ways in which theories of oppression (and policies based upon them) can fail to take into
account the peculiar circumstances of black women in America.2 This focus on aspects of
social life pertaining to oppression, disadvantage, and power imbalences remains central
to intersectionality theory. As Collins and Chepp put it in their textbook entry: “[t]he
first core idea of intersectional knowledge projects stresses that systems of power [...]
1This is a longstanding intellectual tradition, with basic ideas going back to at least the 19th century
[Cooper, 1892/1988]. See [Gines, 2011] for a summary history.
2For instance, take the case highlighted by Crenshaw, in a foundational essay [Crenshaw, 1989]. Black
women employees of General Motors found that they were not legally protected from ‘last hired, first
fired’ forms of discrimination. For, when plaintiffs took a grievance to court, the court ruled that GM’s
hiring and retaining white women meant that they could not be charged with violating laws prohibiting
gender based discrimination, and likewise would not treat black men and black women as separate classes.
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cannot be understood in isolation from one another; instead, systems of power intersect
and coproduce one another to result in unequal material realities and the distinctive
social experiences that characterise them” [Collins and Chepp, 2013, 60].
There are several branches of intersectionality theory. One project focuses on the,
“phenomenological experience of a specific group with intersecting identities” [Parent
et al., 1995, 642]. Another branch of study has focused on metaphysical claims or “the
ontological claim that intersectionality can theorize the convergence, co-constitution,
imbrication, or interwovenness of systems of oppression” [Carastathis, 2014, 307]. Both
lines of research tend to place great emphasis on displaying the full complexity of social
life [McCall, 2005]3
The project we will discuss here, on the other hand, uses highly simplified, ideal-
ized models of human behavior to investigate the emergence of specially intersectional
disadvantage. This might seem to be in tension with the aforementioned approaches to
intersectionality. There is, though, a further tradition of experimental or large scale so-
ciological research explicitly attuned to intersectionality theory. It is this tradition that
our work here is intended to most closely interact with and contribute to. In particular,
we will argue that such simplified models can help address a number of methodological
issues that have arisen in this field.
We will focus on four such methodological issues. First, sociologists have worried
that, “to address intersectional questions, it is necessary to develop complex designs
involving prohibitively large samples” [Cole, 2009, 170].4 The study populations for
women, black people, and the disabled, for instance, are much larger than the study
population of black disabled women, which poses pragmatic research challenges. Second,
theorists have complained that this field of study lacks a well defined method, meaning
that it is often hard to know what explorations count as intersectional [Nash, 2008]. For
instance, when Patricia Hill Collins and her students were called to pick out intersectional
work for a conference they found that“we thought we “knew” intersectionality when we
saw it but couldn’t quite define what it was” [Collins, 2015, 2].
The third critique goes farther, citing methodological difficulties that can lead to
theoretical vacuity. The idea is that in defining intersectional populations, theorists
sometimes appeal to behaviors or features that are themselves to be explained. For
instance, Tommy Curry argues that when discussing the social life of black men, inter-
sectional theorists’ explanation of alleged “violence is rooted in a theoretically justified
circularity” [Curry, 2017, 200]. The charge is that, for lack of good means of inves-
tigating their claims, these theorists generate pseudo-explanations by baking common
essentialist assumptions into their definitions of identify categories. Thus the apparently
empirical explanations or accounts of events that intersectionality theorists offer end up
being mere analytic entailments.5
3Notice that this reflects Longino’s account of what feminist sciences tend to value [Longino, 1995].
4In the quoted passage Cole is reporting on this concern without endorsing it herself.
5For a helpful elaboration and contextualisation of Curry’s charges against intersectionality theory
in this vein, see [Ta´´ıwo`, 2018, §3]. The influential critique contained in [Kwan, 1996] also involves the
charge that intersectionality theory too often works by assuming empirical details and complexities that
really ought be empirically evinced and explained.
2
Last, relatedly, one may worry that the characteristic claim of intersectionality
theory—that some groups suffer what is called ”non-additive” disadvantage—lacks em-
pirical content (at least when applied outside the initial stock of examples drawing from
experiences of African American women). The specter of this worry is raised in [Mutua,
2013]. Mutua argues that the most obvious extension of this claim was simply false
when applied to black men [Mutua, 2013, 345], and, as she describes them [e.g. on 348],
subsequent attempts to develop new hypotheses extending the theory seem ad hoc.6
Hence, while intersectionality theory has been (and continues to be) influential in
both the study of social life and activist responses to oppression in America, it has had
a number of serious charges laid against it in the literature. It has been alleged that it is
too difficult to feasibly study, that it is unclear what its claims amount to, that it only
gains apparent empirical content by rendering its claims analytic or trivial, and that in
investigating non-additive disadvantage it only avoids false claims by being somewhat
ad-hoc in what hypotheses it generates.7
Our work is a contribution to this methodological literature. We present models
which show that intersectional oppression can arise under conditions where social groups
are disadvantaged in the cultural emergence of bargaining norms, either by dint of small
size or by disempowerment. As we demonstrate, this intersectional disadvantage can
arise even when actors from all social categories are completely identical in terms of
preferences and abilities. And when actors behave in ways that reflect stronger intersec-
tional identities, the potential for disadvantage increases.
In deriving these results we illustrate a relatively under-used method for exploring
intersectionality which is especially well suited given the critiques listed above. First,
simulation methods avoid problems associated with sample size. Second, as we will
illustrate, this approach generates theoretically well-grounded hypotheses about a source
of characteristically intersectional oppression. In doing so it addresses a worry common
to Collins, Curry, and Mutua, by providing a source of truly intersectional hypotheses
that may then be precisified and subject to test in empirical study.
Note that our approach both compliments and contrasts with other suggestions that
have been made in the literature to deal with the second problems. [Botts, 2017], for
instance, similarly notes that a common concern about intersectionality theory is that
it has no associated method (350). In response, Botts suggests that ‘it may be most
productive to keep the focus on specific applications’ (353), working out on a case by
6These considerations prompted Mutua (and other theorists she discusses in her essay) to develop
an alternative theory of social identities and their interaction. Whether or not one takes up Mutua’s
preferred theory, it illustrates the difficulties theorists have in bringing to bear intersectionality theory
on new areas of social life, and thereby fruitfully guiding our responses to oppression. For an illustrative
discussion of the epistemic problems that can arise when social researchers have too many degrees of
freedom in deciding what their hypotheses shall be, see [Simmons et al., 2011].
7Methods have been advocated for experimentalists (e.g. Cole [2009]) or sociologists (e.g. Bright
et al. [2016]) that would address some of the peculiar challenges faced by work on intersectionality theory.
(In addition, Gines [2011] argues that intersectionality theory does not need a method peculiar to it.)
However, these responses have focused on ways one can precisify and test an outstanding intersectional
hypothesis. As we understand what is common to the criticisms by Collins, Curry, and Mutua is that it
is often not clear what sort of hypotheses intersectionality theorists should be offering in the first place.
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case basis what an intersectional approach to studying an issue or addressing a social
problem would be. Our proposal contrasts with this in that the model we will develop is
quite abstract and general. But we also hope it compliments this proposal, as ultimately
we hope it can serve as the basis for generating specific intersectional hypotheses about
concrete scenarios, thus helping people carry out Botts’ suggestion.
Third, by generating these hypotheses in a formal framework that explicitly makes
assumptions about the homogeneity of the groups modeled, the modeling framework
avoids Curry’s critique that intersectionality theory only generates apparent empirical
claims by baking substantive empirical assumptions into its description of demographic
categories. By explicitly assuming away culturally or historically laden descriptions of
the demographic groups in question we have tied ourselves to the mast, rendered our-
selves unable to subtly presuppose they will behave as intersectionality theory predicts.
And yet, we shall argue, we have done this in a way that is none the less useful for
identifying ways unequal social power can lead to inequity.
Last, as we will elaborate, the models provide a framework that helps makes precise
several notions of non-additive disadvantage, addressing some of Collins’ and Mutua’s
concerns. In this vein, the methodology can supplement the richer, descriptive empirical
studies typical of intersectionality theory. We shall return to this, but one of our primary
hopes for this work is that it shall facilitate cross- or inter-disciplinary work.8
One final contribution these models can make to intersectionality theory, as we will
elaborate, is in showing how little is needed to generate specifically intersectional dis-
advantage, which may have implications for activist or political interventions on in-
equitable societies. This seems especially important in the context of intersectionality
theory, where it is expected that theorists retain an ongoing connection with the work
of activists [Collins and Bilge, 2016, 198].
We take this work to be relevant to philosophy of science as a methodological dis-
cussion of an important area of social science. However, we also observe that this inves-
tigation makes a meta-point for philosophy of modeling. Philosophers of science have
worried that simplified models may be unable to tell us much about the world.9 We think
this project neatly demonstrates how highly simplified models can play multiple, useful
epistemic roles even in one project, especially in concert with empirical investigation.10
Our paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, we introduce and justify the modeling
framework which we use in the rest of the paper. In section 3 we show how actors in
multiple minority groups can be specially disadvantaged simply by dint of their double-
8For a discussion of the kind of modeling/empirical cross disciplinary work we have in mind, that also
vitally includes negotiation and cooperation with those whose lives are directly affected by the research
topic at hand, see [Poteete et al., 2010].
9For example, Fumagalli [2015, 2016] argues that ‘minimal models’, which he takes to be those
that“lack any similarity, isomorphism or resemblance relation to the world” [Gru¨ne-Yanoff, 2009, 83],
cannot prompt learning about the world.
10Jhun et al. [forthcoming] argue that we should think of models (even a single model applied to a
single target) as tools that can play multiple roles in arguments as does [O’Connor, 2017c]. Previous
authors have argued for broad pluralism with respect to how models explain [Downes, 1992, O’Connor
and Weatherall, 2016], but few philosophers have focused on the pluralism of modeling explanations
within single projects.
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minority status. In section 4, we show how power differences between groups can lead to
intersectional disadvantage, and how both power and minority status can interact in the
emergence of bargaining. In 5 we elaborate how this framework allows us to say more
about what one might mean by ‘non-additive disadvantage’. And in 6, we conclude,
returning to our main points about methodology.
2 Power, Minority Status, and The Evolution of Bargaining
When it comes to the cultural emergence of bargaining norms, recent work suggests
that various features of social groups can impact the chances that such groups are ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged. In particular, it has been shown that minority status can
lead to disadvantage under a number of conditions [Bruner, 2017, O’Connor and Bruner,
2017, O’Connor, 2017a], and also that various forms of economic, or political power can
likewise improve bargaining outcomes for groups [Gallo, 2014, Bruner and O’Connor,
2017, LaCroix and O’Connor, 2018]. Here, we will use these results as a framework for
exploring intersectional effects. In particular, we look at how intersectional identities
can impact the emergence of such discriminatory bargaining norms. In order to do this,
we must first introduce this framework. We begin by introducing models of the cultural
evolution of bargaining between those in different social groups. We then describe the
cultural Red King Effect, by which minority groups can be disadvantaged in the emer-
gence of bargaining conventions, and move on to show how one form of economic power
can likewise impact such conventions.
2.1 The Evolution of Bargaining Between Groups
Evolutionary game theoretic models, in general, represent the evolution or emergence
of strategic behavior in populations of actors, either biological or social. In particular,
they have been of great use to philosophers in understanding the emergence of norms
and conventions in human groups.11
These models start with a game—a representation of strategic interaction that speci-
fies players (who interacts), strategies (what strategic actions they can take), and payoffs
(their outcomes from various sets of strategies). In the Nash demand game, two players
each demand some portion of a resource [Nash, 1950]. If their demands are compatible,
they each receive what they asked for. If their demands are incompatible in that they
exceed the resource, actors are unable to agree on a division and receive a poor payoff
often called a disagreement point.
Figure 1 shows what is called a payoff table for a mini-version of the Nash demand
game.12 Rows represent possible strategies for player 1 and columns for player 2. Entries
to the table list payoffs for each player for each combination of strategies with player
11For examples see Skyrms [1994, 2004], Alexander and Skyrms [1999].
12The mini-game approach to bargaining, which looks at a small but representative subset of possible
strategies for a more complex game, is commonly employed in models of the evolution of bargaining for
tractability reasons. (See, for example, Young [1993], Skyrms [1994].)
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1 listed first. The available strategies are to make a Low, Med, or High demand. For
simplicity sake, we assume that the total resource is 10, that L + H = 10, and that
L ≤ 5 ≤ H. This means that the demands always include 5, plus two compatible
demands that perfectly divide the resource like 1 and 9, or 4.5 and 6.5. The disagreement
point, which actors get for combinations of incompatible demands like Med v. High and
High v. High is chosen to be 0.
Figure 1: Payoff table for a general Nash demand mini-game.
One of the most important solution concepts in game theory, which will also be rele-
vant to our social evolutionary approach, is that of a Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria
are sets of strategies in a game where no actor can unilaterally switch and improve their
payoff. Because of this they are often stable in the sense that actors playing them will
have no incentive to change. There are three Nash equilibria of this mini-game—Low
v. High, Med v. Med, or High v. Low.13 At these pairings, if an actor demands more,
they get the disagreement point, if they demand less, they get less.
To be clear, this model of interaction, though highly simplified, captures the features
we will need to represent discriminatory bargaining norms. Individuals divide resources,
and are incentivized to come to a bargaining agreement. And this division can either be
equal, or can advantage one of the two participants.
Besides the game, the other feature of an evolutionary game theoretic model is the
dynamics. These are rules that specify how the behaviors of some group of actors en-
gaging in a strategic scenario will change over time. The most commonly used dynamics
in evolutionary game theory are the replicator dynamics which suppose that successful
strategies become more prevalent in a population while those that do poorly die out.
These dynamics have been shown to bear deep formal relationships to explicit models
of individual learning [Bo¨rgers and Sarin, 1997, Hopkins, 2002] and learning by cultural
imitation [Bjo¨rnerstedt et al., 1994, Weibull, 1997, Schlag, 1998] so we will employ them
throughout the paper as a model of cultural evolution in populations developing con-
ventions of bargaining. We can imagine it representing a situation, for example, where
individuals repeatedly bargaining and periodically copy bargaining strategies that seem
to be working well for others. Over time, given this type of imitation, we see group-level
patterns of behavior emerge.14
13To be completely clear, there are three pure strategy Nash equilibria. We will not address mixed
strategy Nash equilibria because they are not relevant to our evolutionary results.
14The version of the replicator dynamics we employ is similar to the discrete time two population
replicator dynamics, but where individuals interact with members of both populations and where one
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There is one last element to the framework we employ, and this is that we focus
on populations divided into social groups—women and men, or white people and black
people, for example. We assume that everyone in the population recognizes these social
categories as the relevant ones for choosing strategies and for picking imitative role
models. Either type may be in the minority, or else the two types could be equally
prevalent.
If we evolve such models we find that separate conventions emerge for in-groups and
out-groups. In particular, when members of either type interact with their in-group
they come to do one of two things. Most commonly, they all eventually learn to demand
Med, or to treat each other fairly. Sometimes they develop a fractious pattern of behavior
where some actors demand High and some Low. Of more interest for our purposes are the
conventions that emerge between the two types. These reflect the three Nash equilibria
described above—either one type demands High and the other Low, or else they make
Med demands of each other. Axtell et al. [2000], looking at similar models, describe
the two sorts of outcomes where one type demands High of the other as discriminatory
in the sense that actors treat out-group members differently than in-group members to
the detriment of the out-group. This is also how we will capture discrimination in this
project.
2.2 The Cultural Red King Effect
The Red King effect occurs in biology when two mutualistic species co-evolve, but at
different rates. Bergstrom and Lachmann [2003], using an evolutionary game theoretic
framework, show that under some such conditions the slow evolving species is more likely
to end up getting more of the products of the mutualism.
Bruner [2017] replicates this effect in a cultural context when a minority group inter-
acts with a majority one. As noted, there are three possible outcomes for the evolutionary
models we employ: one group gets more, the other does, or they make fair demands.
The cultural Red King effect occurs when a type that is in the minority becomes more
likely to end up being discriminated against. Under the replicator dynamics, this occurs
when that discriminatory outcome has a larger set of starting population states that
evolve to it, and thus becomes more likely to emerge.
Why might we see this effect? While minority types meet majority types commonly,
as a result of their prevalence in the population, the reverse is not true. This means
that the majority is very significant to the minority from a payoff standpoint, leading
to a situation where minority members are more reactive to the majority group and
learn more quickly how to interact with them. In cases of bargaining and division of
resources, the minority can end up at a disadvantage as a result [Bruner, 2017, O’Connor
population may be smaller than the other. Let x and y represent the two populations so that x+ y = 1
and x ≤ y. Strategies for population x update according to x′i = xi( fi(x,y)∑n
j=1
fj(x,y)xj)
) where xi is the
proportion of the x population playing strategy i, fi(x, y) is the fitness of type i in x given the population
states of x and y, and
∑n
j=1
fj(x, y)xj is the average population fitness for x given the states of x and
y. Strategies for population y update according to the analogous dynamics.
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and Bruner, 2017, O’Connor, 2017a].15
Figure 2 shows this effect. Results are proportions of 10k runs of simulations that
end up at each of the three possible outcomes between types.16 Let L = 4 (so that the
three demands are 4, 5, and 6). Let p1 be the proportion of the majority type in the
population, and p2 the minority, so that p1 + p2 = 1 and p2 ≤ p1. As is evident from
the figure, when p1 = .5, meaning that the two types are equally prevalent, the most
common outcome is the one where the two types make fair demands of each other. The
two discriminatory outcomes are equally likely to emerge. As p1 increases, three things
happen. First, fair outcomes become increasingly unlikely. Second, the majority group
becomes increasingly likely to end up demanding High. And third, the minority group
becomes increasingly unlikely to demand High.
Figure 2: Basins of attraction for groups playing a Nash demand game as p1 varies.
In other words, simply by dint of small numbers alone, members of a minority group
can be disadvantaged in the emergence of bargaining. The cultural Red King effect
is documented in much greater detail by Bruner [2017], O’Connor [2017a]. As these
authors point out, in some models a cultural Red Queen effect can also occur, where
the majority instead gains an advantage. This happens if, because of the details of their
strategic situation, minority members quickly learn to make High demands and, as a
result, gain an advantage from their reactivity. O’Connor [2017a], though, argues that
if actors are risk averse or show in-group preference, common assumptions that hold of
15Rubin and O’Connor [forthcoming] also find a similar effect in actors of two types bargaining on a
network.
16We use the discrete time replicator dynamics to generate these simulation results. For each trial
the proportions of strategies in each type are randomly chosen and we evolve populations until they are
converging to one of the three equilibria.
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many real-world actors, the Red King is a much more powerful effect in the cultural
realm.
2.3 Power
Nash [1953] used an axiomatic approach to argue that in rational choice scenarios of
two player bargaining, a more powerful player can gain resources for themselves via a
credible threat. Bruner and O’Connor [2017] explore not how actors can wield power
to their benefit in a rational choice scenario, but how power differences between social
groups can translate into an advantage with respect to emerging bargaining norms.17
We will use a notion of power drawn from Nash’s original work and employed by
Bruner and O’Connor [2017] as well—that of asymmetric disagreement points. Suppose
that when members of social groups bargain, and when bargaining breaks down, the fall
back position for one group tends to be better than for the other.18 Figure 3 shows a
payoff table for a game integrating this assumption. This is the same game shown in
figure 1, but where the disagreement point for player 1 is D, assuming that D ≥ 0.
Figure 3: A payoff table for a mini Nash demand game with different disagreement
points.
Suppose two groups evolve bargaining norms and one receives a higher disagreement
point, D. Although we will not show a figure outlining these results, as D increases
the likelihood that the powerful group ends up at the equilibrium where they demand
High also increases. The likelihood that they end up demanding Low or Med drops
[Bruner and O’Connor, 2017].19 In other words, their powerful situation translates into
advantage vis a vis the emergence of bargaining norms. This is because groups with
higher disagreement points are less incentivized to learn lower demands, since these
demands do not yield outcomes that are significantly better than the disagreement point.
17These authors employ their results to explore how power differences in the academic hierarchy can
translate to credit advantage in co-authored papers. Their results, though, are in fact quite general.
18In economic work on the family, this assumption has been employed in models of household bar-
gaining. Suppose that men tend to have a generally higher level of wealth, and better access to gainful
employment, than women. When men and women bargain over household labor, then, the idea is that
should the bargain break down (leading to household dissolution), men will tend to end up better off
[Manser and Brown, 1980, McElroy and Horney, 1981].
19The robustness of this result has been verified by O’Connor [2017b], LaCroix and O’Connor [2018],
who show how the same effect occurs in agent-based models.
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We will now employ these two sets of results to look at intersectional effects in popula-
tions where norms and conventions of bargaining emerge. In particular we will ask: How
do intersectional identities impact results in these models? And, are small intersectional
groups especially disadvantaged by the cultural Red King or power disparities?
3 Minority Status and Intersectional Oppression
We start with the cultural Red King and move through three sets of models where the
importance of intersectional identity as a determinant of both behavior and cultural
adaptation increases at each step. First, we compare two models where the second
incorporates intersectional identity in a more full-blooded way than the first. As we
will show, this leads to more serious disadvantage for small intersectional types. Then
we present a model with even stronger intersectional assumptions. Although the results
cannot be directly compared to the first two models (as we will elaborate), we see strong
disadvantage for the smallest intersectional population. Across all three models, we find
that the smallest intersectional population is specially disadvantaged solely by dint of
their size.
3.1 Minimal Intersectionality
We start with a model that incorporates intersectional identities, but in a minimal way.
Suppose that there are two dimensions of identity along which a population is split.
For simplicity sake, call the prevalence of the majority and minority types along one
dimension p1 and p2 and the prevalence of the types along the other dimension q1 and
q2. The two dimensions of identity yield four resulting types. We assume that the two
dimensions perfectly crosscut each other so that the proportions of the four types are
p1 ∗ q1, p1 ∗ q2, p2 ∗ q1, and p2 ∗ q2. Figure 4 shows what these proportions might look
like.
Because the models we will look at can get a bit complicated, we will use an example
to help keep track of what is going on. The two relevant dimensions of social identity
for bargaining behavior in this example will be gender—men (p1) or women (p2)—and
race—white (q1) or black (q2). We assume that men and white people will be the larger
types. The four intersectional types are then white men (p1 ∗ q1), black men, (p1 ∗ q2),
white women (p2 ∗ q1), and black women, (p2 ∗ q2). Of course, our models are highly
simplified, and there is nothing in particular that captures the subtle (and not-so-subtle)
differences between different social categories in them. The example is simply to help us
keep the groups straight.
Suppose that this population regularly engages in two sorts of bargaining scenarios,
for each of which only one of their identities becomes salient. For example, one arena
of bargaining could occur in the workplace over salary, benefits, or workload and, in
this arena, race could be particularly salient to the actors. Another arena of bargaining
could occur in the marketplace over the cost of goods, and for this gender could be more
salient.
10
Figure 4: Diagram of proportional representation of intersectional types.
In this model, we expect that two separate processes will occur where bargaining
norms conditioned on race emerge in the workforce and norms conditioned on gender
emerge in the marketplace. We do not expect these processes to impact each other, but
in each arena we do expect the minority group to be disadvantaged in bargaining as a
result of their size, i.e., for women to be more likely to get the short end of the stick in
the market and black people in the office.
To keep things tractable, we will focus on an even smaller version of the Nash demand
game, where actors may only demand High or Low, with payoffs otherwise identical to
the game pictured in figure 1. There are four possible joint outcomes of the evolutionary
processes in this model. First, both men and white people can demand High when
interacting with women and black people respectively, who demand Low in response.
Second, men and black people can demand High. Third, women and white people can
demand High. And last, women and black people can demand High. Figure 5 shows the
proportions with which these outcomes emerge in the model as the size of the majority
types increases. We assume that the two majorities are the same size, or that p1 = q1.
20
As is evident from the figure, as the sizes of the larger populations increase it becomes
increasingly likely that men and white people demand High. It also becomes very unlikely
that both women and black people demand high. And last, it becomes slightly less likely
that the outcomes where women and white people or men and black people both demand
High occur. These outcomes are a result of two cultural Red King effects, one for each
of the evolving bargaining scenarios.
20This assumption allows us to easily display our results. We investigated models where p1 and q1
varied independently and generally the greater either one was, the greater the disadvantage for the small
types.
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Figure 5: Proportions of four possible joint outcomes for minimally intersectional pop-
ulations.
In this case it is most likely that members of the largest intersectional group end
up making High demands in both arenas, and least likely that members of the smallest
intersectional group do. This is arguably not truly an intersectional effect, though, as
the outcomes are straightforwardly derived from two processes by which minority groups
are disadvantaged. (In such a scenario, more robustly intersectional effects might occur
if there are ways these processes combine to impact the lives of those involved. This
could be the case if, for example, workplace bargaining determines what actors have to
bargain over in the marketplace.)
3.2 Moderate Intersectionality
Now we consider a model with a stronger sort of intersectionality. Imagine a scenario
as above where there are still two arenas in which bargaining occurs, and that each sort
of identity is salient in one arena. Now assume, though, that actors only learn socially
from those in their intersectional type. At the market, for example, white men do not
assume that any man is a good role model for them (even though gender is salient for
interaction), but only adopt role models who also share their race.
This small assumption greatly alters the cultural evolutionary process in these mod-
els. In particular, it means that the difference in learning speed between the largest and
smallest types is much more significant in both arenas of interaction. This results in a
much stronger Red King effect as is evident in figure 6. In the previous model, at the
most extreme values of p1 and q1, the largest population ended up always demanding
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Figure 6: Proportions of four possible joint outcomes for moderately intersectional pop-
ulations.
High about 45% and the smallest population 11% of the time. In this model these values
are now 76% and 1.5%.
In this case, the stronger intersectional assumptions in the model translate directly
into a more significant disadvantage for the smallest intersectional group, and a stronger
advantage for the largest group. In the next section, we look at a model with even
stronger intersectional assumptions.
3.3 Strong Intersectionality
We now assume that there is just one arena of interaction for our intersectional groups,
and that within this arena only intersectional identities are salient for interaction. In
other words, the individuals pay attention to intersectional identities in determining
both 1) how to interact with bargaining partners and 2) which role models to choose.
The outcomes of this model are quite different from those presented in the last
section. In- and out-group conventions now develop between each pair of the four possible
intersectional types. This means that for each outcome of the model there are six types
of out-group conventions, each of which may go one of two ways. Rather than report
the proportions of runs that end up at each of these outcomes, we instead calculate the
proportion of time each type spends demanding High of out-group members averaged
over simulations.
Figure 7 shows results for this model. As in the last two models, we see that as
the proportions of types grows more disparate, the disadvantage for the smallest type
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Figure 7: Average proportion of high demands for strongly intersectional populations.
becomes more significant, while the advantage for the largest type increases. In this
model, again, the effect is fairly dramatic. When p1 = q1 = .9 white men demand High
90% of the time, compared to 9% of the time for black women. This occurs because
in a single arena, again, the size difference between the largest and smallest types is
significant, leading to a strong cultural Red King.21
4 Power and Intersectionality
The models just presented tell us that under conditions where actors are members of two
sorts of minority groups, and where actors take their intersectional identities seriously,
members of small intersectional groups are at special risk of disadvantage as a result of
dynamical effects.
In this section of the paper, we will now look at situations where there are power
differences between groups. The goal here is twofold. First, we provide a robustness
check on the sorts of intersectional effects we have been describing—similar patterns
emerge even under different modeling choices. And second, we give examples of models
that are perhaps a bit more realistic.
21Note that there is something unrealistic about this model, which is that the conventions developed
need not be particularly consistent. For example, it could be the case that black women discriminate
against white men, who discriminate against white women, who discriminate against black women. This
sort of circularity does not occur in the two arena models.
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4.1 Minority at Work, Powerless at Home
Let’s first consider another two arena model like those discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Suppose now that the two arenas of interaction are the workplace, where race is more
salient, and the home, where gender is more salient.
As before, let’s assume that in the first arena of interaction—the workplace—black
people tend to be in the minority so that the prevalence of white people, p1, ranges
from .5 to .99. And in the home, let’s assume that men tend to have greater economic
privilege, meaning their disagreement point for household bargaining, D, ranges from
0 to 3.9 while women’s disagreement point is always 0. (We’ll assume that L = 4 and
H = 6 for this set of models, as in the previous ones.)
As in the previous set of models, we look at a case where actors display minimal
intersectional identities when it comes to choosing role models (i.e., copy those of their
race at work, and those of their gender in the home), and also a case where actors use
role models only from their intersectional groups.
We find that the disadvantage generated by a cultural Red King effect at work,
and by a power disadvantage at home can compound to create special intersectional
disadvantage. Figure 8 shows results from the moderately intersectional models. We
show a subsection of parameter values intended to capture the joint effects of power
and minority status.22 Again we show basins of attraction for the four possible joint
outcomes of the model as we increase the disadvantage for both black people with respect
to proportional representation at work and women with respect to power at home. We
use a bar graph here rather than a line graph because the x-axis represents two changing
parameter values with no straightforward relationship to each other.
As the figure makes clear, these variations lead to increasing disadvantage for women
and black people, but especially for black women. At the most extreme values for
disadvantage, they always demand Low in almost every simulation. White women are
also strongly disadvantaged in these simulations because the effects of power are stronger
than those of the cultural Red King.
As in the models solely relying on the cultural Red King, we also see a stronger inter-
sectional disadvantage here when actors choose role models only from their intersectional
types. For example, in figure 8, at the most extreme values white men always demand
High in almost 80% of simulations. For the same parameter settings in the model with
non-intersectional role models, white men always demand High in 63% of simulations.
(We do not display these results for space purposes.)
4.2 Strong Intersectionality and Power
We also repeat the strong intersectionality model presented in section 3.3 but using
power asymmetries, rather than size asymmetries, between groups. Remember that now
we simply have four intersectional groups that interact and develop bargaining norms.
22We ran many other parameter values. In general, minority status and lower disagreement point led
to increased disadvantage.
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Figure 8: Basins of attraction for moderately intersectional populations with power and
minority status.
Actors pay attention to intersectional types both in choosing their strategies, and in
choosing role models to imitate.
We now assume that the four types are equally prevalent in the population. But,
because of the background conditions in their culture, there are power differences be-
tween them. We assume that white men have the most power so that in general when
bargaining breaks down they will have a good fall back position and that black women
are especially disempowered. We also assume that white women and black men occupy
a middle ground, and for simplicity sake always give them the same amount of power.
This is operationalized by making the disagreement point for white men always 3, for
black women always 0, and for white women and black men varying it between 0 and
2.5.23
This might initially sound like a strange model. We start by assuming that black
women are disadvantaged and then observe a disadvantage for them. But notice that we
start with differences in power, and then look for subsequent disadvantage with respect
to resource division.
Figure 9 shows results from this model. The x-axis tracks the disagreement point for
black men and white women. On the y-axis we see the proportion of time that each group
demands High when meeting out-group members, averaged over all runs of simulation at
that parameter value. When D for black men and white women is 0, all the intersectional
groups (besides white men) are equally disadvantaged. As the disagreement points for
23We looked at many other values for these parameters. In general, the higher the disagreement point
for a group, the better for them, and vice versa.
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the mid-power groups increases white men become slightly less likely to demand High
in interaction, because now they are slightly more likely to end up disadvantaged with
respect to these groups. Black women, though, become very unlikely to ever demand
High. When D = 2.5, they only do so about 1% of the time.
Figure 9: Proportion of interactions demanding High for four strongly intersectional
groups.
Notice here that the trends related to disadvantage for black people and women
generally do not capture how black women are disadvantaged in particular. When D is
higher, in this scenario, while black men and white women do better on average, black
women do worse. Part of the observation here is that in cases where intersectional types
are truly all that matter, disjoint aspects of identity may have little power to predict
disadvantage on their own.24 Of course, in this model we freely vary the disagreement
points of the four groups. If we assume that the disagreement point for black women is
somehow a combination of those of black people and women, things will be different.
Before moving on to the discussion, we will pull out the sense in which these models
display minimal conditions for the emergence of intersectional disadvantage, as described
in the introduction. The generation of disadvantage here does not depend on represen-
tations of psychological features usually associated with discrimination. For example,
the agents do not exhibit in-group preference and out-group bias, or implicit bias, or
stereotype threat. We think these sorts of effects are important to full explanations of
24Note that in the strong intersectionality model in the last section, this was not the case because
assumptions in the model meant that when the small intersectional group got smaller, this was a result
of decreasing size of the two single dimensional groups making it up.
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real world oppression, but our models tell us that we can get it even without them. The
preconditions necessary for oppression in our model are 1) intersecting minority demo-
graphics (or intersecting groups with power differentials) 2) actors who learn to behave
in their best interest and 3) a strategic interaction that involves resource division. These
minimal conditions tell us that intersectional disadvantage is easy to generate, under-
pinning claims by intersectional theorists that systems of power and oppression cannot
be understood without understanding intersectional effects.
5 Quantifying Non-Additive Disadvantage
To summarize the last two sections, we found that the cultural Red King effect can
produce special disadvantage for intersectional types, and that this disadvantage is worse
when stronger assumptions of intersectional identity are made in the models. We also
found that power and the cultural Red King can combine to produce intersectional
disadvantage, and that power differences alone can lead to such disadvantage.
In order to fully understand how these results bear on intersectionality theory,
though, we need to look more carefully at the theory itself. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, one of its core ideas is that in some sense or another oppression is not additive
[Bright et al., 2016, 63]. Broadly speaking, this means that the combined effect of being
oppressed along multiple axes is worse than one might expect if one were to naively sum
the consequences of each form of oppression considered individually. As noted, Mutua’s
concerns about intersectionality theory first arose specifically when attempting to apply
claims about non-additive disadvantage to the situation of African American men.
We now investigate the sense in which the disadvantage we have observed in our
models meets this criterion. As it turns out, though, this is not a straightforward task.
To accomplish it, one first needs sufficient theoretical background to generate a null
hypothesis—by which we mean a theory of what it would look like for the oppressions in
question to have a ‘merely’ additive effect. However, theories of oppression are not often
formulated in sufficient detail to allow for the clear prediction, or even statement of, such
a null hypothesis. This is broadly in line with Collins’ concerns in [Collins, 2015]. It also
relates to Curry and Mutua’s respective concerns about whether intersectionality theory
has anything substantive to say about novel empirical scenarios that it was not explicitly
formulated to deal with. To address her concerns Collins advocated greater clarity about
the central notions of intersectionality theory. To gain this clarity, we think it is first
necessary to precisify what a non-intersectional type of oppression, i.e. an additive one,
would look like, and we can use the modeling framework presented here to do so.
We will present here two plausible precisifications of additive oppression to contrast
non-additive effects with. The first criterion can be illustrated with a story. Suppose
an employer encounters a job applicant who is black and a woman. Suppose further
that they discriminate against black folk with probability Pb and women with Pw. If
they are not being intersectional it may be as if they flip a coin (or are moved by
what they had for breakfast that morning, or what the radio was discussing on the
drive in to work, or whether or not the sun is presently in their eye, etc) to decide
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which is more salient to them, race or gender. They then focus on that aspect of the
applicant in deciding whether to discriminate. In this case one would expect a level of
discrimination somewhere in between Pb and Pw, because the combined chance of being
discriminated against is a convex combination of the two chances of discrimination. With
this understanding of non-intersectional oppression, we can say that there is non-additive
intersectional oppression when the probability of being discriminated against given that
you are a black woman is greater than both Pb and Pw.
A second, and quite different, null criterion is given by the following. In deciding
whether to discriminate, it is as if the employer draws from first Pb and then Pw. If
either proscribes discrimination, the employer discriminates. So if Pb = .2 and Pw = .2,
the employer would discriminate against black women with probability .36. This is a
second, stronger but plausible ‘non-intersectional’ level of discrimination.25 Notice that
we could apply these two standards of non-additivity, for example, to measure special
intersectional disadvantage for black women when it comes to firing practices. Is their
rate of firings higher than that for both women and black people? Is it higher than the
combined probability of firing for women and black people?
In the rest of this section we will use these two possibilities to discuss the results we
have presented. For our models, we can calculate, given a set of parameter values, the
probability that members of each group are discriminated against over all simulation
outcomes. (This probability is slightly different from the ones just described in motivat-
ing our criteria because it is averaged over a set of mutually exclusive outcomes. It does,
however, capture something about the general chances of disadvantage for each group.)
For all the models we have presented, except when group sizes and disagreement
points are equal, the most disadvantaged intersectional group suffers from non-additive
oppression in the first sense. I.e., the probability of being discriminated against if you
are a black woman is always greater than the probabilities of discrimination for one’s
two component identities. In general, as minority status becomes more dramatic, or as
disagreement points for disadvantaged groups become lower, this difference in probability
of discrimination for the intersectional group and the component identity groups also
becomes more dramatic.
Some parameter settings of our models also show non-additive intersectional disad-
vantage in the second sense. Figure 10 shows various probabilities of discrimination for
the moderate intersectionality Red King model. As we can see, for all values of ma-
jority size, p1 = q1, the probability of being discriminated against as a black woman,
P (D|Bl&W ), is greater than or equal to that for black people or women, P (D|Bl)
and P (D|W ), meaning it meets the first criterion as just described. When p1 = .9,
P (D|Bl&W ) > P (D|Bl)&P (D|W ), or the probability of discrimination as a black
woman is more than that expected if one met discrimination at the rate of both black
people and women combined.
Likewise, for the moderate intersectionality power models, when D = 3.9 and p1 =
25Note that these two criteria will not capture null predictions for all cases of intersectional oppression.
Consider empirical results showing that black women earn a lower wage than either white women or black
men. Because these are not probabilistic results, neither of our senses of additive discrimination apply.
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Figure 10: Probabilities of discrimination for different groups across parameter values.
.9, the probability of discrimination for women is .3 and for black people is .55. The
probability of discrimination for both of these identities combined in the second sense
would be .69, but the actual experienced probability of discrimination by black women
is .75, meaning there is again special intersectional disadvantage in both of the sorts of
ways we identify.
The take-away from this discussion is two-fold. First, we find that the sorts of effects
we have been outlining can generate non-additive intersectional disadvantage in either
of the two ways we describe. On the less demanding criterion, all the models we consider
generate such a disadvantage. Second, the modeling framework here allows us to generate
very precise notions of what additive (and thus non-additive) disadvantage entail for
some sorts of situations, which is responsive to extant critiques in intersectionality theory.
6 Conclusion
We would now like to return to our claims in the introduction that the simulations
here can help address methodological critiques in intersectionality theory. First, it is
easy to see how the models here avoid the pragmatic trouble of testing large enough
sample populations. Because ‘populations’ in simulations are completely unconstrained
in size there is no problem testing intersectional effects, even if one wanted to look at
the intersection of many identities. (Of course, this is a general virtue of using modeling
methods in intersectionality theory even if one is critical of our particular models for
whatever reason.)
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Second, as indicated, the models here provide well-ground empirical hypotheses for
causal processes that can lead to genuinely intersectional disadvantage. In cases where
members of small intersectional populations (or especially disempowered ones) divide
resources with larger groups, and are at a bargaining disadvantage, theorists now have
a new explanatory possibility. In general wherever we see resource division between
intersectional social groups with some size/power asymmetries, our models predict that
at least one sort of non-additive disadvantage should arise. If it should turn out that
our models’ predictions are not borne out in such cases this may be problematic for
intersectionality theory more generally. The fact that our models point to a potential
set of empirical results that would be troubling for intersectionality theory is actually a
boon to the theory, seen against backgrop of the concerns of Collins, Curry, and Mutua.
When it comes to experimental tests, these models suggest studies, using methods
from experimental economics, that have the potential to show these effects in groups
of real humans. In particular, experimentalists can have groups of individuals in the
lab engage in bargaining games to see whether especially small intersectional groups, or
disempowered ones, tend to take home less. Along these lines, Mohseni and O’Connor
[2018] have used previous work on the cultural Red King effect to direct a laboratory
experiment which has produced evidence that the effect occurs among human subjects.
Notice that the hypotheses generated here, as noted, help address worries from Curry
about ‘vicious circularity’. In these models there is no doubt that it is the fact of existing
group identity, combined with minority status and power disadvantage, that causes
economic inequity. In other words, we see clearly that real intersectional disadvantage
can emerge from facts about identity, rather than acting as a suppressed definition of
identity.
While some might worry that our models are simplified, and highly idealized, this fact
helps them address Curry’s critique. As we have emphasized our models do not display
many of the characteristics that contribute to real-world inequity, such as psychological
features, or society-wide features like segregated neighborhoods, police violence, and
gendered pay inequalities. Removing these contextual details makes clear that we are
not building in the intersectional effects, but rather showing how they can fall out of
basic assumptions about group membership and strategic interaction.
This minimality also means the models can play another explanatory role, in showing
how surprisingly little is needed to generate intersectional effects.26 Our first set of
models show how groups can end up disadvantaged merely by dint of being particularly
small. The second set shows how one aspect of empowerment can compound to further
economic disadvantage. In other words, very small asymmetries between groups can
start processes of intersectional disadvantage. This sort of observation is particularly
important in thinking about interventions on inequitable systems. For example, our
models show that even if we managed to completely eradicate out-group bias in social
groups, such as might be the idealised outcome of corporate seminars on implicit bias,
we should still expect simple processes of learning to divide resources to nonetheless
26See O’Connor [2017c] for more about this particular explanatory role in simple models.
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generate special disadvantage for intersectional groups.27
The last thing we will highlight here is the conceptual contribution made in section 5
that we hope goes some way towards addressing Collins’ concerns. Simply trying to as-
sess modeling outcomes helped generate measures that may be useful to empirical studies
of intersectionality as well. Which of the two senses of additive non-intersectional disad-
vantage one thinks is the more plausible contrast case (if either) will presumably depend
on contextually salient facts about the particular domain of potentially intersectional
disadvantage one wishes to study. To this extent, as we noted in the introduction, our
use of minimal models to study intersectional disadvantage would be best deployed in
tandem with more historical or richly descriptive empirical studies of particular domains
of application.
From a philosophy of modeling standpoint, this entire exploration demonstrates how
highly simplified models can play many important epistemic roles in arguments about
real world systems (even within one modeling project), contra some philosophical view-
points. In general, the models here play a role somewhat reminiscent of that outlined
by Morgan and Morrison [1999]—that models can mediate between theory and data.
For example, simulations of particles in physics have been used to generate physical
equations of motion. Here theoretical work on intersectionality, including critiques of
empirical methods, inspired modeling work that can, in turn, help drive further empirical
investigations, and well as theoretical ones.
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